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Abstract 
The Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and The Sarbanes­
Oxley (SOX) regulations greatly influenced the health care industry regarding the means 
of securing financial and private data within information and technology. With the 
introduction of thin­client technologies into medical information systems (IS), data 
security and regulation compliancy becomes more problematic due to the exposure to the 
World Wide Web (WWW) and malicious activity. This author explores the best practices 
of the medical industry and information technology industry for securing electronic data 
within the thin­client environment at the three levels of architecture: the SQL database, 
its middleware application, and Web interface. 
Designing security within the SQL database is not good enough as breaches can 
occur through unintended consequences during data access within the middleware 
application design and data exchange design over computer networks. For example, a 
“hospital’s medical records, which are routinely exchanged over computer networks, are 
subject to the audit control an encryption requirements mandated for data security.” 
(Department of, 2008). 
While there is an overlapping of security techniques within each of the three 
layers of architectural security design, the use of 18 methodologies greatly enhances the 
ability to protect electronic information. Due to the variety of IS used within a medical 
facility, security conscientiousness, consistency of security design, excellent 
communication between designers, developers and system engineers, and the use of 
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According to A Guide to the Sarbanes­Oxley Act (2002) and the Consumer Bill 
of Rights and Responsibilities (2001), the implementation of laws in the United States 
(U.S.), such as Sarbanes­Oxley (SOX) and Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) has placed a burden on the medical industry to assure 
information privacy. This is an exploration of the methodologies for securing patients’ 
personal, financial and confidential information contained within a medical SQL 
database, and securing its middleware application within thin­client environments by 
conducting interviews with Information Systems (IS) specialists within the medical 
community, and by evaluating IS documentation pertaining both directly and indirectly to 
the medical industry. 
This document is written with a qualitative approach using grounded theory 
obtained from various resources including: documentation and information provided 
from IS specialists within the medical community, Oracle, International Business 
Machines (IBM), Institute of Electrical Electronic Engineers (IEEE), International 
Organizations for Standardization (ISO), National Institute of Standards (NIS), 
Association for Information Standards (AIS) and publications on technology security 
solutions. Other resources include medical organizations such as the Electronic Delivery 
of Information in Healthcare, medical journals such as the Health Industry Insights, and 
government agencies such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
This study provides an in­depth overview of database security design and its 
application security design and Web implementation design requirements. This study is 
relevant to readers who are responsible for implementing and maintaining security in 
1
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thin­client environments within not only the medical field, but also, more broadly across 
the Information Technology (IT) sector. The information provided is from 
standardization entities, and medical IT publications that compare and analyze the 
security designs of various medical SQL database and middleware applications within 
thin­client environments. 
Due to a high variety of marketed security offerings by SQL database vendors, 
application providers, and thin­client providers, the issues involved in securing a medical 
database and its corresponding applications within a thin­client environment can vary 
significantly depending on the specific IS implemented (Bunker, 2007). As a result, no 
single security solution sufficiently meets every environment’s requirements (Bunker, 
2007). The purpose of this investigation is not to dictate what should be done, but rather 
to offer various solutions and methodologies at each level of architecture by focusing on 
three specific areas of concern: database­design specific security, database middleware 
design interface security and database/middleware­Web Server interface security design. 
2
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
The rules and regulations set forth by the Sarbanes­Oxley (SOX) and Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) has placed a burden on the 
medical industry to assure information privacy. From 1998 through 2001, those in the 
medical industry struggled with interpreting the laws and setting into place the data 
security that was necessary to meet their interpretation of the laws. The medical industry 
as well as many industries that were required to meet these laws did not have historical 
information which to build data security (History, Overview, 2008). Thus, many unique 
security solutions developed that gradually have in some part, become standardized 
(Bunker, 2007). With the introduction of thin­client technology, complex solutions are 
required. Information technology personnel have concerns regarding how to insure SOX 
and HIPAA security compliance between SQL databases, their n­tier applications, and 
Web interfaces. (Singhal, 2007) 
. 
1.1 – SOX Compliance 
In Section 302 of the SOX Act (i.e. Appendix A), periodic statutory financial 
reports are to include certification of the following: 
1.	 The signing officers are responsible for the internal controls and have evaluated 
these internal controls, within the previous ninety days, and have reported on their 
findings. 
2.	 A required list of all deficiencies in the internal controls and information on any 
fraud that involves employees, who are involved with internal activities, is 
included with the financial statements. 
3
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3.	 Any significant changes in internal controls or related factors that could have a 
negative impact on the internal controls are included with the financial statements 
(A Guide To, 2002). 
For the medical industry, these laws pertain to the organizations internal financial 
records including patient financial records and insurance carriers. A simple record within 
an SQL table of a medical billing database may contain data fields that require: 
1.	 Limited or no access by certain personnel for viewing data records, which would 
require an “As needs to know.” role within the organization. 
2.	 Limited or no access by organization outsiders but related parties, such as:
 
insurance providers, medical researchers and clinical trials personnel.
 
3.	 Access monitoring by activity log files noting users who have accessed a record, 
the date and time of access and changes made. 
4.	 Audit table updates for each record when view, edits and updates occur, noting 
the user, the date and time the record was accessed 
Table 1 reflects the role relationships in a simple SQL database table that you will 
note adds complexity to a secure database design. While there is some cross over 
between the SOX and HIPAA laws it is important to know that SOX is a regulation 
concerning internal financial reporting, presentation, and security while HIPAA is 
more representative of an individual’s personal privacy. 
1.2 – HIPAA Compliance 
Chapter Six of the HIPAA rules and regulations (i.e. Appendix B) is on the 
consumer’s privacy rights. Within the regulation, it states the health care consumer has 
the right to know that health care information is treated with confidentiality, that health 
4
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care information be protected and not shared with anyone, unless the consumer has 
provided written permission. There are three main requirements: 
1.	 With very few exceptions, individually identifiable heath care information can be 
used without written consent for health purposes only, including the provision of 
heath care, payment for services, peer review, health promotion, disease 
management, and quality assurance. 
2.	 In addition, disclosure of individually identifiable heath care information without 
written consent should be permitted in very limited circumstances where there is a 
clear legal basis for doing so. Such reasons include medical or health care 
research for which an institutional review board has determined anonymous 
records will not suffice, investigation of health care fraud, and public health 
reporting. 
3.	 To the maximum feasible extent in all situations, non­identifiable health care 
information should be used, unless the individual has consented to the disclosure 
of individually identifiable information. When disclosure is required, no greater 
amount of information should be disclosed than is necessary to achieve the 
specific purpose of the disclosure (The Advisory Commission on Consumer 
Protection & Quality in the Health Care Industry, 1999). 
As with the SOX regulations the above HIPAA regulations lends to thoughtful 
consideration to user roles for accessing information within a medical SQL database. 
Access to SQL databases and their tables are through key relationships to and from 
another table within one relational SQL database, or data mining across multiple medical 
databases it is important to know how each piece of data relates to the overall security of 
5
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information. Based on the SOX and HIPAA laws provided above, Table 1 is an 
interpretive example of how each field in a data record within one SQL medical billing 
table relates to each law. 
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Insurers Read 
Clinical & Research No Access 








Clinical & Research No Access 








Clinical & Research No Access 
Insurance 
Carrier 








Clinical & Research No Access 
Insurance Group 
No. 








Clinical & Research No Access 
Insurance Yes Yes Yes Admissions Create, Read, Update 
Membership Caregivers No Access 
No. Billing Read, Update 
Insurers Read 
Clinical & Research No Access 





Create, Read, Update 
Read 
Clinical & Research No Access 





Create, Read, Update 
Read 
Clinical & Research No Access 





Create, Read, Update 
Read 
Clinical & Research No Access 





Create, Read, Update 
Read 
Clinical & Research No Access 






Create, Read, Update 
Read 
Clinical & Research No Access 
Last Accessed Yes Yes Yes Admissions No Access 
Caregivers No Access 
Billing No Access 
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Insurers 
Clinical & Research 
No Access 
No Access 
User and role access within a SQL database allow or restrict end users with views. 
The roles trigger a specific view that shows only the information the user or group is to 
see. 
In review of Table 1, note that no user has delete functionality because under 
Medicare, the record retention period is 5 years and a patient can file a grievance on a 
HIPAA violation up to 6 years (Calloway, 2001/2006). Medical industry best practices 
state to retain all records, noting patient statuses such as, active, inactive, or deceased. 
Dependent on the institution or organization Information Systems (IS) personnel archive 
the patient information that exceeds the statute of limitations (D. Ricci, personal 
communication, August 8, 2008). 
1.3 – SOX and HIPAA Impact 
The impact of the SOX and HIPAA laws have on a SQL medical database, the 
application, and the Web interface require scrutiny of the types of data that require 
security. Mapping the data aids in identifying areas of concern and too, to note possible 
areas of conflicts. Exceptions to the SOX and HIPAA laws require some flexibility 
within the IS environment. 
1.3.1 – Exceptions to the SOX and HIPAA laws 
Under SOX, there are no exceptions to the laws that govern financial reporting, 
information security, and accountability. However, under the HIPAA laws there are 
several exceptions: medical or health care research for which an institutional review 
8
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board has determined anonymous records will not suffice, investigation of health care 
fraud, and public health reporting (The Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection & 
Quality in the Health Care Industry, 1999). Thus using user role controls within the 
database may become convoluted, impede a user from accessing needed information, and 
role changes made after the fact, within the IS may possibly break the chain the security 
throughout the database, application and Web interface. This is not to say that user roles 
should not be used for security purposes, it is however, important that user roles are 
planned and designed throughout the IS, and used with other security options to allow for 
exceptions and user flexibility. 
1.3.2 – Flexible Security Solution with SOX and HIPAA Compliance 
The SOX and HIPAA regulations are to protect those with invested interest and 
the consumers. While the laws have made it clear what must be done they do not define 
how it is to be done. Not knowing how, has made it difficult for those who are 
responsible to insure the laws are upheld and has especially been difficult for those 
working within Information Systems (History, Overview,, 2008) While there are many 
IS security solutions, not all are viable solutions for every organization (Bunker, 2007). 
Much planning is needed for security processes through database design, n­tier 
application development and Web implementation (Singhal, 2007) so as not to break the 
chain of security at different levels of technology, yet not burden the end user with 
remembering a multitude of passwords, or impeding their ability to work efficiently. 
9
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Chapter 2 – Review Literature and Research 
In McGovern’s book A Practical Guide to Enterprise Architecture, McGovern 
defines thin­client technology as accessing a network either by Internet browser or 
specialize client software, to processes information where the client software primarily 
focuses on conveying input and output, not processing data. Thin­client is the direct 
opposite of fat­client technology where the majority of processing takes places on the 
user’s computer and client software and the server is a main storage device. In the thin­
client environment, significant data processing occurs at server (McGovern et al., 2004). 
Breaches of security through knowledge of an approved user credentials, blended 
threats, SQL injection and other malicious activities do occur. In an article on data 
security, Litwin states the most vulnerable points that a breach can occur are at the 
internal user and workstation, the remote user and workstation, and the Internet. 
Breaching of the network hardware security mean data protection is dependent on 
measures incorporated into the databases, the applications and the Web interface (Litwin, 
2008). 
Figure 1 depicts a typical networks security configuration for thin client 
technologies. While hardware configurations and third party security solutions are not 
part of this study, a quick overview of the configuration is helpful in understanding thin­
client technologies. The uses of firewalls, secure switches, and address masking aid in 
achieving maximum hardware security. In some facilities, an additional internal firewall, 
often referred to as the Clean Firewall is present. The Clean Firewall monitors all 
internal Web network activity. The firewall external to the network is the Dirty Firewall 
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and monitors both incoming and out going Web activity. (B. Williams, personal 
communication, July 28, 2008). 
2.1– Networking Security 
Figure 1 - Typical Network Configuration 
Meier in an article on data security for Microsoft’s Web products presents a visual 
representation of known Web server vulnerabilities shown in Figure 2. These 
vulnerabilities are internal and external to the network. In a medical organization, any 
one of these breaches will place sensitive patient and financial information at risk. 
1.	 Information disclosure and code disclosure obtained from reading unsecured 
source code on the Web Site risks unauthorized application changes and 
malicious alterations to IS systems. 
11
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2.	 Arbitrary code execution in unrestricted data field entry, results in malicious 
cross­site scripting, SQL injection, and path transversal, that result in 
unauthorized access to data and information and compromised data. 
3.	 Profiling, is port scans, ping sweeps, banner grabbing and NetBIOS­Enumerations 
that interfere with authorized user access, responding with information for 
unauthorized user access, and malicious interference of IS operations. 
4.	 Denial of Service causing buffer overflows and SYN Floods, that directly
 
blocking authorize user access.
 
5.	 Viruses, Worms and Trojan Horses that are malicious code and programs that 
directly compromises data and information, and replicate throughout the IS 
systems. 
Programmed to monitor and thwart these types of vulnerabilities the dirty firewall 
is the first line of defense externally to the Web Server. The internal and clean firewall is 
the second line of defense between the Web Server application and the database. Once 
a breach of security occurs at the Web server, it is up to the security designs of the 
applications and databases to protect data to meet SOX and HIPAA requirements for 
privacy of information. 
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Figure 2 - Web Server Vulnerabilities 
(Meier et al., 2003) 
IS personnel incorporate the use of user identification (user ID) and password 
combination as the first layer of network access security. According to Singer, IS 
personnel often configure user ID and password combinations to replicate throughout the 
network to allow for ease of user access to various databases and applications. By 
replication of user ID and password, end users do not have to reenter their identification 
for each database or application on the network, thus making user access easier and 
expedient. However, not every user needs access to every database and application on 
the network, therefore each database and application needs added security measures (H. 
Singer, personal communication, July 28, 2008) 
The user ID and password combination allow a user access to a network, then once on 
the network, access to applications or access to database. Each user ID assigned to a role 
determines what applications and databases the end user has access. Roles are assigned to 
Groups, thus for a user whose job function is admitting patients who come into the 
emergency room (ER), the user ID is assigned to the role admission within group ER. 
13
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2.1 ­ User ID and Passwords 
The baseline of user security begins with whom to allow access to a database, an 
application, the Web interface and the network. The Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
and other standardization groups provide standardizations for setup and design, yet each 
organization must decide the impact of their added security design on the users. 
According to the standards set by the Office of Information Technology Solutions 
(OITS), IEEE, and the NIST, there are four standardizations of user ID. One states user 
first letter of first name and a minimum of seven characters of the last name. If the name 
has fewer than seven characters, or is a common name that has several users such as John 
Smith, then numeric assignment to fill the last digits, thus jsmith becomes jsmith01, 
jsmith02. The second standardization is first name.last name with the same numeric fill 
as above for common names, john.smith or john.smith001. The third is first name _last 
name with the same numeric fill as above john_smith or john_smith001. A fourth 
standardization is the last name only with a numeric fill as above, for example smith001, 
smith002. A standard is eight or more characters, dependent on the operating system or 
the use of legacy systems that are eight­character restricted. 
The password standardization is no fewer then eight characters that are case 
sensitive with at least one uppercase, one symbol, and one numeric value (IEEE, 2006). 
An example is the password gandolf could then be 6@Nd0lF. 
In addition, there are other security methodologies used rather than sole dependency 
on ID and password access to secure data and information such as: 
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1.	 Data encryption within the SQL database or the application based on the user ID 
and role. 
2.	 Based on the user’s role limited views of data and information. 
3.	 Based on the user’s role limited menu access to an application. 
4.	 Based on the user, sessions limited to access during known working hours. 
5.	 Use of audit logs on network access, and database or application or both that 
records, Creation, Read, Update, and Deletion (CRUD) activity along with the 
user ID, date, and time of the event. 
6.	 SQL audit table inserts of records field update activity along with the user ID, 
data, and time of the event. 
7.	 SQL audit table inserts of the use of Dynamic Linked Libraries (DLL) that trigger 
table drops or reconfiguration. 
8.	 SQL updates that insert the last user ID and the date and time of CRUD activity to 
the record. 
9.	 Pseudonymization, a technique where identification data is transformed, and 
replaced by a specifier that cannot be associated with the identification data 
without knowing a certain secret 
10. Use of certificates, Secured Socket Layers (SSL) or Kerberos to allow a user 
access to a network, database, or application based on need, role or group. 
According to McGovern, any combination of the above are used to secure 
databases, applications and Web interface. The more combinations that are used, the 
more complicated security becomes. Reviewing and testing security practices for their 
effectiveness is a good practice. While strengthening security is important, there is a 
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chance of interfering with a user’s ability to work efficiently within their software 
environment (McGovern et al., 2004). 
2.2 – Database Security 
Oracle Corporation, Microsoft Corporation, Novell, and International Business 
Machines Corporation (IBM) to name just a few, have incorporated the use of user roles 
into their network, database, and application management. The premise of roles is to 
separate users into groups that allow or denied access to specific software modules or 
database tables based on job requirements and what information the position needs to 
know. Yet, this is one of the first critical areas for a breach of security between the 
application and the database, as shown in Figure 3 (H. Singer, 2008). 
Figure 3 - User and Database Roles 
While the admissions personnel have access to the medical billing patient table 
within the medical billing database, they do not have a need to access to any other 
database on the network. Yet, the medical billing database itself does have permissions 
to access other databases on the network through the primary key field that is the patient 
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ID. A breakdown of security occurs when the user role access changes from the 
originating user role to the systems database role. The systems database role normally has 
administrator privileges, allowing it free access to perform actions that the general user 
cannot such as, accessing a trigger that will update tables that the user is not aware of but 
are important to data integrity. Thus, when admissions personnel seek additional 
information on the patient ID, the other database(s) receive a systems request from the 
medical billing database and allows for the CRUD activity of the patient information. 
According to Barak in his article, The Proactive Security Toolkit and Applications, this 
misinterpretation of the user role can occur within the database security design or the 
application security design (Barak, Herzberg, Naor, & Shai, 2002). 
Another related security breach can occur when a SQL savvy end user knows the 
names of SQL tables that they do not have user access permissions. If this user has the 
ability to create tables on the fly within a database, the user may then have the ability to 
extrapolate data from a restricted table into the users newly created and owned table 
without recognition by the database as a denied user. This user may also have the ability 
to assign other users access rights to the newly created table that then offers those users 
the ability to view data that they would not normally have access or be privy to. 
According to Greenwald in his book, Oracle Essentials, this occurs when the request for 
the data to the protected table looks as though it is coming from the system, or the system 
administrator and not the originating user (Greenwald, Stackowiak, & Stern, 1999/2004). 
2.2.1 ­ User Roles and Groups 
Dependent on the organization there could be many roles for groups of users. 
Such as role by job function and grouped by departments are used. In a hospital 
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environment, this could be admissions – radiology, admissions­pediatrics, and 
admissions­cancer­center. It may not be necessary for the admissions personnel within 
one healthcare specialization to see the patient’s private information within another area 
specialization, therefore having the personnel grouped by specialization also adds 
security (D. Ricci, 2008). Database and application developers design views, encrypt 
fields, disable or hide menu offerings, and control general access with the user roles and 
groups in mind (Watson et al., 2005). 
2.2.2 ­ SQL Database Views 
According to Christensen in his book, The Project Manager's Guide to Software 
Engineering's Best Practices, there are no hard rules or standards presented by any of the 
standardization groups that state all views should be created in the database rather than 
the application presentation layer, or conversely (Christensen, Schneider, Thayer, & 
Winters, 2001/2003). There are reasons one would be the choice over the other. 
1.	 If creating a new SQL database placing the views within the database is a good 
security choice. The reasoning being, is the application developer can then script 
to a procedure call based on the user role to the views, which then adds a layer of 
security. 
2.	 If using an old SQL database that contains usable views then placing all the 
views within the database makes the same security sense as in item 1 above, but 
also preserves design continuity. 
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3.	 If creating an application that crosses platforms with legacy SQL databases and 
nonSQL databases then it makes sense to develop the views within the 
presentation layer of the application based on the user roles 
4.	 If creating an application for front­end security so as to hide the database, creating 
views with alias naming conventions (discussed later under applications) is the 
choice (Christensen, Schneider, Thayer, & Winters, 2001/2003). 
While restricting views so an end user is not aware that certain information exists 
is an excellent security measure, it may not always be possible. Data and information 
pulled from legacy system may require data encryption based on user groups and roles. 
2.2.3 ­ Data Encryption within the Database 
The encryption method to use is dependent on the SQL database and the product 
version. At this writing, the most recent versions of Microsoft SQL, Oracle, and Sybase 
have Advance Encryption Standard (AES) encryption capability. Earlier versions of 
these products offered Data Encryption Standard (DES) encryption except for Microsoft 
Windows 2000, which did not allow for in record data encryption (Andrews, 2001). 
The National Institute of Systems Technology highly supported DES that applies 
a 56­bit key to each 64­bit block of data. That offered 72 quadrillion or more possible 
encryption keys. However, in October of 2000 the NIST opted to drop their standard of 
triple­DES for the use of AES as it comes in 128, 192 and 256­bit versions (Smid, 2001). 
When working with data field encryption, developers must plan and be aware of the 
ramifications, as it has occurred that a developer has locked everyone, including himself 
from viewing data (Woody, 2007). Encryption will slow the retrieval of data since the 
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data will have to decrypt for permitted user roles to view the data. For imaging SQL 
medical databases such as Picture Archive and Communication Systems (PACS), 
encryption may not be a practical option (Riedl, 2008). Pseudonymization may offer an 
alternative solution. 
2.2.4 ­ Pseudonymization 
In his article for the IEEE, Pseudonymization for Improving the Privacy in e­
Health Applications, Riedl defines Pseudonymization as a technique where 
transformation of identification data occurs and replaced by a specifier. The specifier 
cannot be associated with the identification data without knowing a certain secret (Riedl, 
2008) such as a Personal Identification Number (PIN). This technique is encryption for 
the entire database, not a field or a table, and the database must have at lease two tables. 
Riedl states, that one of the tables is that of protected information, and the second table 
being the table that contains the pseudonyms and the pseudonymized data. Known as 
depersonalization, the process is to remove direct association between the personal 
information and the person’s identity. There are two possible ways of depersonalization, 
one is with the use of algorithms for calculating the pseudonym and the second is hashing 
techniques. Hashing techniques are the least secure, as reversal of hashing requires 
access to a stored list of all the pseudonyms. A breach of security can compromise the 
stored list and then the data (Riedl, 2008). 
Riedl, states that encryption provides a more secure alternative for building 
pseudonyms. The process uses a symmetric algorithm to create a secret key that paired 
with a user’s asymmetric key allowing access. Because these keys must be kept secret, 
they are best applied to smart cards systems or key fob systems as this eliminates 
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performing cryptographic operations on open systems, hence one more layer of security. 
The down side is that the cards and fobs can be lost or stolen (Riedl, 2008) 
2.2.5– SQL Database Update on CRUD 
A practice of some medical organizations is to update the SQL database record 
each time a record is touch (T. DeLuca, personal communication, August 2, 2008). The 
record update takes place as the record closes, and an update to a last access field with 
user ID and a time and date stamp. While considered a good practice within the medical 
industry, to note the user who was the last to create, read, or update a record, there lacks 
the history of every user who has touched the record. Ricci stated that this practice is 
good for SQL queries for searching database tables to monitor user activity and the 
possible attempt or actual breach of security (D. Ricci, 2008). 
2.2.6 ­ Audit Logs and Audit Tables 
According to Swanson in her document for NIST standardization, Generally 
Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information Technology Systems, audit 
logs are at the server level, the application level and the database level. Used to monitor 
user activity at each level, audit logs are useful in determining if someone has attempted 
or has breach security. The server level, audit logs record each user’s access, the time of 
access and the time of user exit. The application and database developers determine the 
activity recorded within the application and database audit logs. The NIST recommend 
audit logs in both the database and application (Swanson & Guttman, 1996/2008). The 
logs are plain text updates that record user SQL, CRUD, and operational activity which 
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can be read and therefore compromised. Writing audit logs to obscure disk locations and 
not necessarily on the same server add an additional layer of security. Audit logs offer 
accountability, activity reconstruction, intrusion detection and problem detection 
information (Swanson & Guttman, 1996/2008). 
Padilla in his article written for the IEEE, Don't Gamble with HIPAA Security 
Compliance, states that tracking of user updates to specific data fields and inserting the 
information into an audit table is another means of meeting SOX and HIPAA security 
requirements. The premise of audit tables is a trigger that will activate on a SQL 
UPDATE command that will update an audit table with the old information, the new 
information, the user ID, and date and time stamp. Not all record field activity requires 
this type of audit however, when items such as, patient name, social security number, 
insurance carrier, employer, disease diagnoses, pharmaceuticals, and other protected 
information are altered, a record of who made the change, the original data, and the 
changed data is a good practice (Padilla, 2005). 
2.3 – Application Security 
In his book Object­Oriented & Classical Software Engineering, Stephen Schach 
states that Object­Oriented Programming (OOP) is quickly becoming the industry 
standard for application development. OOP is the foundation of Web based applications 
and is layered n­tier (Schach, 2007). 
In his book Visual C# 2005, Watson states, the theory of OOP is to keep 
application coding reusable, consistent, and expedient. The coding patterns make it easy 
to change one class without affecting another class or taking a program off­line (Watson 
et al., 2005). A design flaw or a change in code may cause a breach within the security 
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design. As discussed in a previous section an undesirable effect would be for a users’ 
role to change to a systems role when requesting data or information. 
An example of role changes within is the application software is the admissions 
personnel in the ER group create a new patient record (Presentation Layer). The ER­
Admissions role has limited access to the billing database (Data Storage Layer). 
However, a business rule (Business Logic Layer) states to avoid the possibility of 
duplicate patient information, a newly created patient ID must replicate to all patient 
databases throughout the organization. The ER admissions personnel do not have access 
to all of the other databases (Data Storage Layer). The business logic layer calls a 
procedure within the database or application, triggering an event with administrative 
permissions to update all patient relational databases with the new patient ID. This event 
occurs in background however, the user’s permissions should remain in place for all 
subsequent transactions. 
Each layer of the n­tier design, an example of which shown in Figure 4, is for 
purpose and functionality of each application. Layered n­tier design applications can 
either attach to a SQL database or written to contain data within an application data file. 
The code containing scripts to attach to a database or output to a named file is located in 
the data layer of the n­tier application. There is also a layered n­tier known as the Model 
View Controller (MVC) that directly interfaces with a SQL database from the 
presentation layer. While n­tier layer design looks exactly like MVC design, the major 
difference is that the MVC allows direct interface with the database from the presentation 
layer (McGovern et al., 2004). 
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Figure 4 - N-tier design layers 
According to Monroe in his book, Architectural Styles, Design Patterns, and 
Objects: Software Engineering, many of the security method, such as, user views, data 
restriction, and data encryption, that are available within SQL database design, are also 
available within application design. There are no hard rules regarding which security 
method the application handles, and those that the database handles (Monroe, Kompanek, 
Melton, & Garland, 2003). Not all layers of the n­tier design are specific to security or 
should have a security purpose. 
2.3.1 ­ Data Storage and Management 
There are two schools of thoughts on the data storage and management layer. The 
first is allowing access over a network and the second is placing the database behind a set 
of database handler routines. According to Britton in his book IT Architectures and 
Middleware, allowing access over a network exposes the database to a malicious user. 
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Hiding the database behind database handler routines is old technology but allows the 
database design to change while preserving the original interface (Britton & Bye, 2004). 
While the MVC model does permit OOP applications direct linking to the SQL database, 
OOP allows for the use of data field aliases which aides in shielding the database tables 
and their data fields. According to Britton, the preferred method is adding an additional 
layer of security by hiding the database behind a set of database handler routines. 
2.3.2 ­ Data Access Layer 
The data access layer provides a simplified means of accessing the data. Rather 
than using the standard means of an SQL statement such as Update and Delete, procedure 
names that call SQL coded within the database are used, thus allowing the database to 
manipulate the data. According to McGovern, using database procedures is an excellent 
means of cloaking the database operations from view and from those who do not need 
know how the database works. Within many organization’s it is common for the 
middleware application developers to have the knowledge of what procedure to call, yet 
not the intricate knowledge of how the procedure works within the database (McGovern 
et al., 2004). Singer states that while allowing the application developers access to 
procedures and not having the complete knowledge of the database is going to extremes 
to protect information, HIPAA does state that non­ identifiable health care information 
should be used to maximize security (Singer, 2008). 
2.3.3 ­ Business Layer 
Christensen in his book The Project Manager's Guide to Software Engineering's 
Best Practices, states that the business layer compartmentalizes calculations and the 
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business rules. Also divided by activities, the code within the business layer is 
responsible for pulling a medical image from a PACS database or a recent prescription 
from a pharmacy database based on user request. As stated earlier, the risk is the code 
call for data access using administrative permissions to a secondary database for one 
purpose and not returning the original user permissions thus, giving the user access to 
data that the user should not have access to (Christensen & Thayer, 2001). 
2.3.4 ­ User Interface Layer 
Britton in his book, IT Architectures and Middleware, states the user interface 
layer is the directions to the business layer to respond in a certain way when the user 
enters information, clicks on a button, or depresses key within the presentation layer 
view. The user interface layer is solely for functionality within the presentation layer and 
workflow and not for security (Britton & Bye, 2004). 
2.3.5 ­ Presentation Layer 
The presentation layer is what the user see’s. If not using the SQL database 
views, then the views based on the user role, are part of this layer, as are active menu 
selections. According to Britton, if the application requirements call for the use of 
encryption, this is the layer where the encryption scripting takes place (Britton & Bye, 
2004). As with database encryption, the NIST recommends AES. 
2.4 - Web Publishing Security 
Publishing an application to a Web server varies on the software and technology 
used. Each supplier has security tools to aid in publishing and securing a Web Portal 
using standard security tools: 
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1.	 Use of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) that is the IT Industry standard for security 
technology that establishes an encrypted link between a Web Server and a users 
browser using Public Key and Private Key certificates. 
2.	 Public and private keys certificates also work with a third party entity known as 
the certificate authority to match the keys. Private keys are created with several 
lines of data known only to the host, are digitally encrypted using a mathematical 
formula. The certificate authority validates the user and the public key, and then 
matches the public key with the private key to allow access. 
3.	 Kerberos is an authentication protocol developed by Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT). Kerberos is freely available from MIT, and made available in 
many commercial products (Basch, 1990/2008). Kerberos requires the use of 
secret­key cryptography much like that discussed under Pseudonymization. In 
Microsoft’s security (Figure 7), the SSL technology is optional while Kerberos is 
a required security methodology, compared to Oracle (Figure 6) where SSL 
combined with key certificates is the primary security methodology. 
Microsoft’s instructions for publishing states that a review of connection settings, 
membership settings and other security setting on the Web server before publishing and 
to disable debugging, tracing, and custom errors after publishing (How To: Publish Web, 
2005). Each vendor has their own means of securing their Web server(s). IBM suggests 
access scanning on demand using Nessus tool as shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 ­ Websphere On Demand Security Scan 
(IBM Websphere Portal, 2006) 
Oracle uses a blend of Secure Socket Layers (SSL), credentials and key 
encryption to secure their Web Server. The wallet as shown in Figure 6, manages public 
key security credentials. A public key is a value provided by a designated authority 
(Usually a database administrator (DBA) or systems administrator (SA).) as an 
encryption key that, combined with a private key allows a user, Web server access. 
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Figure 6 ­ Oracle Public Key Infrastructure 
(Hale & Levinger, 2003) 
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Microsoft, shown in Figure 7, uses a combination of their own security products, 
combined with SSL or Kerberos or both. 
Figure 7 - Microsoft Web Security 
(Meier et al., 2003) 
Shepherd, Zitner and Watters recommend using different access rules for each user role 
(Shepherd, Zitner, & Watters, 2000) as do Oracle, SAP, Microsoft and IBM. Dependent 
on some technologies, access becomes available when users have matching keys or 
certificates. The question is what portal security is the best fit for the application and 
database designs, as it may come down to a combination of some of the above, or other 
recommended technologies used by specific vendors. 
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2.4.1 – Certificates and SSL 
There are various schools of thought regarding using certificates to secure access 
between the end user thin­client and the Web server and the application. According to 
Jonathan Kames the advantages and disadvantages of SSL over Kerberos are: 
1.	 Advantages 
a.	 SSL does not require an accessible trusted third party to establish a secure 
connection. 
b.	 SSL does not require the user to have a secret certificate or PIN. 
2.	 Disadvantage 
a.	 If a system is compromised revocation certificates have to be circulated to 
all relevant servers and cached for a long time. 
b.	 Servers have to verify incoming user certificates against a revocation 
server and in that case, the revocation server must be highly available to a 
third party. In this case, the use of a third party eliminates the purpose of 
using SSL. (Kamens, 2000) 
2.4.2 – Breaching of Network Information and Code Disclosure 
While on any Web page, clicking on the browser menu option of View, and then 
on the menu option Source will allow the user to read the source code of that page in 
plain text. HyperText Markup Language (HTML), Extensible Markup Language (XML), 
and HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) are the base of Web publishing and at the heart 
of thin­client technology. Compiled code in Java, C++, C#, Visual Basic or other 
application design products assists in stopping a malicious intruder from seeing private 
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information. The source may reference the application code by description such as, 
<script language="javascript" type="text/javascript"> but the compiled code itself is not 
readable. This is why Microsoft recommends that prior to publishing a Web application 
that a review of connection settings, and membership settings be preformed and to 
disable debugging, tracing, and custom errors after publishing (How To: Publish Web, 
2005). The World Wide Consortium (W3C) is currently working on security 
documentation to cover the WEB industry best practices. Today they support using a 
combination of both SSL, Kerberos, and using AES as standards for WEB portal security 
(W3C, 2008). 
Oracle, Microsoft, IBM, Novell, Apache, and other vendors, all have hardware 
and protocol solutions to help block intruders from obtaining information and code access 
however, such intrusions happen. The blocking of intrusion with hardware configuration, 
protocol settings and additional protection software goes beyond the limits of this study. 
Yet how to defend the application code and network information is an important issue to 
address, and should be part of every Web­based software planning. 
2.5 – Summary of Security Practices 
The standard for IS, is to first use user ID and password combinations to allow 
access to servers, applications, and databases. When using Microsoft’s products the user 
ID and password is authenticated through the IIS and passed on to the .net application, 
which in turn passes the authentication through to the Microsoft SQL Server and 
database. If all medical organizations solely use Microsoft products this would simplify 
security procedures, yet this is not realistic. Many medical organizations have legacy 
database operations and other non­Microsoft servers, databases and applications in use. 
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Thus various security procedures are used to protect internal financial information and 
patient privacy information (Bunker, 2007), and user ID and password is only the 
beginning of security procedures. 
The use of user roles and groups is the second link in the security chain as they 
help to define what each user can do while accessing the servers, applications and the 
databases. Application developers and DBA’s design views, and perform encryption on 
data fields based on the user roles and groups (Christensen, Schneider, Thayer, & 
Winters, 2001/2003) and the SA’s block user access to applications and databases based 
on user roles and groups and timed sessions. Since some legacy systems do not 
recognize or cannot recognize roles, user certificates, keys and data encryption become 
another link in the chain of security. However, SQL savvy personnel and people with 
malicious intent can breach these security processes. Thus, the audit logs and tables track 
possible breaches of security, and to help locate where the breach in security or the 
weakness in security take place (Swanson & Guttman, 1996/2008). 
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Chapter 3 – Security Methodologies 
When E.F. Codd made his ground breaking speech in 1969 on the relational 
database model (Codd, 1969), and the use of SQL, he understood the importance of raw 
data and how to covert data to excellent information. Codd saw the relational database as 
data repository with strong table relationship and strong data normalization. Codd never 
discussed SQL as a programming language. Nor did Codd discuss how to use SQL to 
control data input, and to be procedural. Yet within only a decade, the relational database 
model became the foundation of database structure for vendors such as Oracle, Microsoft, 
and eventually IBM. SQL became more than a means for querying data as it also became 
a means for data manipulation. According to Casteel in her book Oracle 10g SQL, the 
problem with SQL is that it is open code and is easily read and interpreted. Anyone 
having access to the database can virtually see the database structure, read the code, 
change the code and manipulate the data (Casteel, 2006/2007). Casteel states, the best 
practice within the Oracle environment is to use Programming Language (PL), PL/SQL 
to create procedures, functions and triggers to hide the general SQL CRUD scripts from 
the general user. The term T­SQL or Transact SQL is the term used within other SQL 
environments and performs the same programming functions. 
To go an additional step in order to protect the data, developers use complied 
code such as 4gl, Visual Basic, Java, C++, C# and a host of other software development 
tools to create front­end applications solutions to shield the SQL database completely 
from the end­users. As SQL has grown, developers have also incorporated additional 
means of securing data within the SQL database itself. No longer is the SQL database 
solely a relational model data repository. 
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When each user logs into an IS there is a cause and effect across a network. What 
the user views on the main menu is that which the IS personnel have programmed and 
developed for that specific user or user group. While some IS personnel subscribe to 
showing all menu options and disabling options for specific users and groups others 
create menu views specific to a user or group. According to Ricci, medical industry’s 
best practice is to show only the menu items specific to a user, role, or group, thus 
limiting user knowledge of other network applications and databases. (D. Ricci, 2008) 
While this seems elementary, much work goes into developing the different views and 
testing user access to assure the user does not erroneously have access permissions to 
other application and databases (H. Singer, 2008). For end user ease of access to the 
applications and databases servers across the network, replicate the user ID and 
password. However, each server, application and database has a set of permissions for 
the user, role or group. Thus, recognition of each user, role, and group takes place and 
access allowed or denied by the servers. If the server has several applications or 
databases and the user or group has access rights to one of them, then the server allows 
access. With the use of user schema, it is up to application or database to recognize the 
user role or group and allow or deny access. Yet, there are probabilities of security 
breaches with limited knowledge of user ID, group and password. 
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ϖ 
Figure 8 - User Login Cause and Effect 
SQL databases contain schemas for user ID and passwords, roles and groups. 
Dependent on the organization users can log in directly into a database or through a front­
end application. According to Casteel in her book Oracle9i, the problem with allowing 
users to log directly into a database is that they have better opportunity to manipulate data 
such as creating their own tables, copying data from one table to another, authorizing 
other user’s access to their own created tables, and performing global updates (Casteel, 
2003). User permission counters these types of activities and there are no rules, 
standards, or regulations stating that direct connectivity to a relational database through 
thin­client is unacceptable. However, it is highly recommended that a middleware 
application be the access point and a level of protection between the Web server and the 
database (Meier et al., 2003). 
Within medical organizations, there is often a melding of technology. The billing 
database may be on an Oracle 10g PL/SQL solution, while the Siemens PACS is using 
Microsoft SQL 2008 and the patient history database is located on a legacy IBM Informix 
based mainframe. The systems administrator user ID and password does not have to be 
the same for each system, nor does the systems administrator User ID and password for 
one IS and environment have to allow full access rights the other IS’s and environments 
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(B. Williams, 2008). With varying administrator passwords a database compromised by 
use of the administrator password and ID on one IS system, dose not necessarily 
compromise the data on the other IS systems. 
3.1– Security Breach Beyond User ID or Group 
Once a user ID and password authenticates allowing access to a network, 
applications, and database a probability of SQL injection and other malicious activity 
increases, developers must code and script security measures into their applications and 
databases. According to Bunker in his article, Is Your Privacy Protected? malicious 
activity is a process of invention and it is very difficult to anticipate every possible 
security breach (Bunker, 2008). This is why audit logs and tables become very important 
for reconstruction of events. Using the information obtained from the logs, developers of 
SQL databases and applications can build in additional security measures (Swanson & 
Guttman, 1996/2008). However, planning and taking precautions during the design and 
development phases to counter the known malicious activity is the best strategy (Bunker, 
2008). 
3.1.1 – Limiting the Possibilities for SQL Injection and Malicious Activity 
SQL injection attacks occur when SQL commands inserted into a field of entry, 
such as the User Id field, reveals or manipulates data other than the fields intended use. 
This can be one SQL command or procedural SQL scripts, dependent on how many 
characters the field allows. As an example, one of the mean for gaining access to a 
database is for a hacker to enter into the user ID field the SQL statement below. 
‘UNION SELECT id, name, ‘’, 0 FROM sysobjects WHERE xtype = ‘U’ 
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Due to the flexibility of SQL, the SQL interpretation to the above line is as a selection 
request for all users from the user table. 
‘UNION SELECT 0, UserName, Password, 0 FROM users – 
The SQL response is a list of the data contained in the users table of user ID’s and 
Passwords. The hacker can then select any one of the user ID and password and then 
gain access to the database. According to Jansen in an article written for the NIST, 
Computer Security, in this situation, the developers will want to restrict the use of 
specialized characters and length of the field (Jansen W., T., & Scarfone, 2008). What 
presents a problem is that in limiting specialized characters such as the apostrophe (‘) or 
hyphen (­) affects the ability to use the proper form of user names, such as jo’day01 or 
john_o’day. 
If a user ID and password is a known element then the hacker only has to insert 
SQL into fields of entry screen to change or manipulate data. According to Litwin, three 
features make SQL injection attacks quite powerful: 
1.	 With the use of hyphens the hacker has he ability to embed comments within a 
SQL statement and into a data field. 
2.	 The hacker has the ability to alter or destroy data by stringing multiple SQL 
statements together, and to execute them in a batch. 
3.	 Using SQL to query metadata from a standard set of system tables to obtain or 
alter data (Litwin, 2008). 
Litwin states, the best defense is limiting the number of characters allowed in data fields 
(Litwin, 2008). By limiting the number of characters, SQL injection is difficult and near 
impossible because the SQL statement truncates to the character length restriction. Thus 
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the statement ‘UNION SELECT id, name, ‘’, 0 FROM sysobjects WHERE xtype = ‘U’ 
on an eight character restriction truncates to ‘UNION S which the application will either 
deny user access or throw an error. 
According to Jansen, another concern of SQL injection is that some organization 
will use multiple interpreters in tandem with other applications. A harmful operation can 
unobtrusively be passed through the IS from one database or application to another 
compounding the problem. 
3.1.2 – Limiting User by Views 
Using the data fields from Table 1, Chapter 1, Figure 9, reflects an example for 
planning and development of the user views. As a hypothesis, assume that an individual 
with malicious intent has found a means to log into a medical application or database. 
Depending on the identification assumed is what information presents itself in either a 
view, or a SQL inquiry. According to Singer, while views and field encryption keep the 
honest employee, honest, the truth is, that anyone with malicious intent will still be able 
to obtain private data dependent on the user ID and group permissions used. If the 
intruder breached the administrator user ID and password, then all data is available within 
that database (H. Singer, 2008) In his article, Oracle Database Security, Nathan Aaron 
addresses theses issues. Aaron states poor database view designs, poor user access 
schema design, and placing too much trust in employees regarding data access can be the 
cause of users becoming dishonest (Aaron, 2006). 
As previously discussed, a user with the appropriate privileges can create a table 
and give another user access privileges to the table. Thus using the planning views and 
encryption in Figure 9, should the admissions user have the privilege to create a table and 
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gives a caregiver rights to the newly created table, the caregiver now sees all of the fields 
that are denied under the care giver group. 
Figure 9 - Planning Views and Encryption 
Greenwald in his book Oracle Essentials, also states that planning and testing of 
user views in combination with user access rights is an a important practice of DBA’s 
(Greenwald et al., 1999/2004). Both Aaron and Greenwald note that allowing users the 
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3.1.3 – Employee Security Breach
 
According to NIST, security breaches do not always come from the outside. 
Whether it is a disgruntled employee, an employee in financial difficulty attempting to 
make extra monies selling information, or just by shear accident, an employee can often 
find a way to access data and information that they are not privy to, or information 
needed to perform their job function. This is where role specific views, or database or 
data field encryption are useful. However, the update of user ID with a date and time 
stamp into a record when any CRUD activity occurs is an additional security measure 
(Swanson & Guttman, 1996/2008). 
As a new supposition, assume that several patients have complained that they 
have recently been contacted by an insurance carrier representative, who has seemed to 
know their information regarding current insurance carrier, the dates of their admissions 
for medical care, and worst, has ran credit checks based on their social security number. 
SQL queries ran on the billing database, patient table, on the last accessed field of each 
record, can quickly show the count of records accessed on various dates or date ranges by 
each end user. According to DeLuca, A spike by one user compared to other users could 
be representative of a user misusing their position and their access to secure patient 
information. Some medical organization run scheduled SQL queries weekly or monthly, 
on this type of activity to note end user access anomalies (T. DeLuca, 2008). Comparing 
the user’s activity to audit logs and tables will provide additional information such as, 
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3.1.4 – Troubleshooting with audit logs and audit tables 
Rebecca Sausner, in an article from the Bank Technology News Keeping Your 
DBA Honest notes that when George Clooney was hospitalized, that a review of the 
hospitals database audit logs noted every doctor and nurse who violated patient trust by 
celebrity snooping on his medical records. However, if the DBA was the one snooping, 
he knew how to cover his tracks (Sausner, 2008). While third party software is not a part 
of this study, it is important to note that third party electronic signature software exists, 
that tracks audit logs and notes if a breach of a log occurs. 
The use of application and database audit logs show errors within the application, 
process timing, time stamps of events, and user authentication changing from the user to 
a system or administrative user. The audit logs are invaluable for troubleshooting and for 
noting security breaches (Swanson & Guttman, 2008). The user SQL logs reflect the 
actual SQL scripts and the application is reflecting the application scripts. 
A sample user SQL audit log may look like the following: 
jsmith01 10:35:16:08:15:2008 SELECT * FROM billing WHERE pid = 12345 
jsmith01 10:35:16:08:15:2008 SUCCESS 1 row returned 
The corresponding application audit log may look like the following: 
jsmith01 10:35:16:08:15:2008 received from frm_patientR patient_id = 12345 
jsmith01 10:35:16:08:15:2008 service call get_patient 
jsmith01 10:35:16:08:15:2008 patient_id 12345 found 
jsmith01 10:35:16:08:15:2008 frm_admsView refresh ss_no encrypt 
Where the application is concerned several security measures are in place, the 
paient_id is an alias for the database field pid. A procedure get_patient contains the 
42
 
          
 
 
                             
                            
                           
                           
                           
                
                                 
                        
                           
                                 
                               
                        
                              
                           
     
         
                     
                      
                       
                       
     
                               
                                   
Melissa Winner­Leoni Thesis 2008
 
compiled code to access the database, and possible a call to a database procedure thus 
hiding the database name, and the SQL table name within the database. Record retrieval 
to the application shows the end users assigned view that encrypts the social security 
number. No one reading the application audit log will gain knowledge of the database, 
unlike user SQL audit logs that record ever SQL script ran and provide information 
regarding the table accessed and the field name. 
Unlike the SQL server in which audit logs must be located on the server, the user 
SQL and application audit logs, can write to alternate locations (Howie, 2002). 
According to Williams, in the thin­client environment, the last place that one would want 
the user SQL or application audit logs to write is to a workstation hard drive. The SQL 
logs and the application logs grow very quickly in size, if left on their respective servers 
they could easily interfere with processing and space allocation. The industry best 
practice is to select an obscure server for writing user SQL and application audit logs. 
This has a drawback in possible loss of processing speed and in maintenance (B. 
Williams, 2008). 
3.2 – Database Design Security 
As previous noted many security methodologies overlap between the database and 
the application. However, whether planning a SQL database from scratch or 
implementing an existing SQL database into the thin­client environment there are SQL 
database security methodologies to consider beyond the user ID and password, groups, 
logs and views. 
According to the NIST, use of audit tables to note changes to a data record by 
inserting the original data, the changed data and the user ID with date and time stamp is a 
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security methodology to consider (Swanson & Guttman, 1996/2008). The NIST also 
recommends creating audit tables that record Dynamic Link Library (DLL) changes in 
activity such as table creations, table reconfiguration, and table drops. When this type of 
DLL call takes place, an insert into an audit table takes place with the table information 
and the user ID with date and time stamp (Singhal, 2007). Additional database security 
options are: 
1. Use of AES data encryption standardization for encryption of a SQL database 
2. Use of AES data encryption standardization for encryption of a data record field 
3. Use of procedures, functions and triggers called in scripts by name 
4. Limiting the data field input through the use of forced data selection 
5. Limiting by number data field entry characters 
6. Disallowing special character entry within data fields 
7. Restricting user session times to work hours 
8. Restricting users from table creation or table drops 
9. Restricting users from table sharing (Kiely, 2005) 
3.2.1 – AES Data Encryption 
As previously discussed, AES data encryption is the current standard of NIST 
(Smid, 2001). However, there are performance issues with the use of encryption (Riedl, 
2008). Image databases such as PACS would not only use a lot of equipment processing 
time to encrypt and decrypt but also, be a hindrance to a user waiting for the decryption 
process to complete (Riedl, 2008). Yet, the use of encryption and decryption on character 
data is expedient (Smid, 2001). Encryption of the database or only selected data fields of 
each table are encrypted depends on the sensitivity of the data they contain and how the 
44
 
          
 
 
                                
                               
                         
                           
                            
                             
                                  
                               
           
                     
                       
                           
                        
                       
                            
                     
                         
                           
                        
                             
                         
                       
           
Melissa Winner­Leoni Thesis 2008
 
data is linked to the application and the Web portal. When a SQL database directly links 
to a Web portal, IT industry best practice is to encrypt the database (Shepherd et al., 
2000). If a middleware application shields the database then encryption of sensitive data 
fields is an acceptable practice (Smid, 2001). Configuring a database, data table, or data 
field for encryption, results in the objects encryption until a user retrieves the data. 
Decryption of data occurs when the user’s access privileges give the user access to the 
data to perform CRUD activities. If the user has access privileges to some of the data but 
not all, the items that the user does not have access to will remain encrypted. 
3.2.2 – Procedures, Functions and Triggers 
Casteel in her book, Oracle 9i Developer explains the expediency of 
programming PL/SQL procedures, functions and triggers due to compacting code in one 
specific script that called by name by another SQL script, performs SQL calculations and 
CRUD activities. Considered an IS industry best practice, the writing of procedures, 
functions and triggers enhances the functionality through reuse of scripts and not 
displaying SQL activity to the end user (Casteel, 2006/2007). Powell in his book Oracle 
10g Database Administrator Implementation & Administration takes this a step further 
explaining that the use of procedures, functions and triggers are security features to 
protect data integrity and the functionality of the database from the users (Powell & 
McCullough, 2007). The use of procedures, functions and triggers within a database 
allows for the developers of a middleware software application to call each by name, thus 
adding another layer of security between the application and the database by not 
revealing table name, field names, or database functionality information from within the 
application (McGovern et al., 2004). 
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3.2.3 – Limiting Data and Disallowing Special Characters 
While discussed earlier, the methodology of limiting data entry and disallowing 
special characters is used to thwart malicious activity such as SQL injection, however 
there are other security reasons to limit data, and stop users from using special characters. 
Controlling fields of data by drop down boxes, radio box selection and field length 
maintains data integrity. While data selection will not stop the occasional selection of 
Mr. when Mrs. was intended, it will stop other typographical errors that make it difficult 
to perform accurate data extrapolation to obtain information. Data restriction makes it 
difficult for anyone to change data globally within the database, thus the inability to 
change all records to Mr. (Powell & McCullough, 2007). 
Special characters such as the asterisk (*) have meaning within the SQL language. 
The asterisk in SQL means everything, thus having a field containing an * can make it 
difficult to extrapolate data by interfering with the original SQL Select statement 
(Casteel, 2006/2007). As discussed under SQL injection limiting special characters and 
restring field length stops a user from entering SQL commands such as, Update patient 
Set ptitle = Mr., into an entry field and globally changing every patient file, ptitle field, 
in the patient table to Mr. (Jansen W., T., & Scarfone, 2008). 
3.2.4 – Restricting Users 
A concern of DBA’s is restricting users to such a point that they are rendered 
incapable of performing their job function, and is why testing user access is extremely 
important (Powell & McCullough, 2007). However, it is also extremely important to 
assure that user access is not manipulated or misused. Restricting user session access to 
their working hours, sharing user created tables, and the right to create tables is a high 
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security consideration (IEEE, 2006). Restricting users falls under the user schema as 
discussed earlier and noted here solely as an accompaniment to database security. 
3.3 - Application Design Security 
Meir, in an article on design patterns on Microsoft’s Web site states five security 
practices to make when designing a Web middleware application: 
1. Assume all input is malicious.
 
2. Centralize your approach.
 
3. Do not rely on client­side validation.
 
4. Be careful with canonicalization issues.
 
5. Constrain, reject, and sanitize your input (Meier et al., 2003, p. 4)
 
An example of malicious input is SQL injection as discussed above, and thwarted by
 
limiting the number of characters allowed into a field.
 
3.3.1 – Malicious Activity
 
Some data fields cannot be restricted to a small number of characters. What if the 
field of entry is a narrative field such as a patient diagnoses? When writing the code for 
the medical Web application, directing an insert of HTML text tags before and after any 
narrative data field will render the malicious code to text and strip it of functionality. 
Anyone with malicious intent inserting a SQL command such as, DELETE * FROM 
patient into a data field, results in an insert into the database <text> DELETE * FROM 
patient< /text>, and not the deletion all the data contained in the SQL database table 
named patient (Meier et al., 2003). As discussed under SQL Injection rejecting special 
characters such as: %, ­­, //, < >, =, +, ∑ is another option, however within the medical 
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environment this may be too restrictive for the clinical end users who need to comment or 
reference scientific formulas or data, thus the use of HTML tags is also the 
recommendation of the W3C (W3C. 2008). 
3.3.2 – Canonical Restraint 
As previously discussed, layered n­tier OOP application design allows for writing 
code by reuse of patterns, thus making the process expedient and consistent. According 
to Fowler in his book Patterns of Enterprise Application Architecture, poor programming 
practices are hard coding of path locations, specific data values, and pointers to specific 
server names (Fowler et al., 1963/2003). Yet, what if part of a user’s responsibility is 
importing data from external data source, such as the cost of medical supplies from a 
supplier, or insurance payment rates for procedures? For our discussion purposes, we 
will state that the import file downloads to a secure server and a specific directory. 
Rather than hard coding the path into the application, create a SQL system data table, 
designed to contain paths and pointers. The form view references the SQL systems table 
obtains the correct data location, limiting the user to a location, yet allowing the user to 
select the appropriate file to import. This process works in conjunction with user access 
and logins, and the user must have permissions to the secure server, directory and file 
(Meier et al., 2003). 
3.3.3 – Restricting Users 
Restricting user menu selections, limiting the information seen by creating user 
role specific views, and designing field drop down boxes for restricted field data selection 
are tools that aid in keeping data accurate and secure. According to the IEEE, within the 
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thin­client environment, these tools become more important to data security (IEEE, 
2006), as they limit the possibilities for misuse and incorrect data entry. 
Calling database procedures rather then using SQL CRUD scripts within the 
application code, hides the identity of the database and the SQL processes from the end 
users adding an additional layer of security. According to Watson, limiting the calls for 
sys or sysadm roles and making sure the user’s credentials authenticate throughout all 
application and database processes maintains the user roles security. If possible, limit the 
session times that a user can access the application to their regular working hours 
(Watson et al., 2005). 
3.2 – Summary of Methodologies 
While there is overlapping of security methodologies between the SQL database 
and application Table 2 below depicts the methodologies discussed. An important note is 
that some methodologies work in tandem or individually, either within the database or the 
application dependent on the technologies used and the data location. As an example, 
database encryption would eliminate the use of field encryption within the application. 
Yet, if the application pulls from two data sources such as a SQL database and a legacy 
database, field encryption may take place at the SQL database while the legacy field 
encryption takes place at the presentation layer of the application. 
Table 2 ­ Security Methodologies 
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Use of User ID and password validation for IS Yes Yes 
authorization. 
Creating user views based on user roles. Yes Yes 
Configuring audit logs on server. Yes Yes 
Creating database and application audit logs Yes Yes 
Limiting character entries to an appropriate length, for Yes Yes 
the data contain in the data fields. 
Eliminating use of special characters that SQL would Yes Yes 
interpret as a command function 
Designing data entry to insert HTML tags to render No Yes 
malicious SQL code injection harmless 
Limiting field entry to drop down selection items that are Yes Yes 
specific to the type of data requested and not left to user 
input. 
Limiting user menus selections to only those applications Yes Yes 
and databases the user needs in order to perform their job 
function. 
Saving user database and application log activity to an Yes Yes 
obscure server 
Creating audit tables within the database to track CRUD Yes No 
activity of private information 
Creating audit tables within the database to track table Yes No 
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DLL activity especially the activity that pertain to table 
creation and table drops. 
Use of procedures, functions and triggers called by name Yes Yes 
rather than general CRUD statements 
Use of field name aliases to conceal database tables and No Yes 
fields 
Use of AES encryption to conceal data contained within Yes Yes 
a database or data fields. 
Limit user sessions to business hours or work schedule to Yes Yes 
prevent illegal access during non­business hours. 
Controlling access by authorized users by using SSL, Yes Yes 
Kerberos, or key certificates 
Using all 18 methodologies within a thin­client environment between the SQL 
database, its software application and Web Server interface is very probable. Dependent 
on the technologies in place, the use of data extrapolated from legacy systems, and new 
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Chapter 4 – Analysis and Results 
While stated in Chapter 1 that the medical industry did not have a history to assist 
when planning security to meet the HIPAA and SOX regulations, today it does (D. Ricci, 
2008). IS security best practices developed over the past ten years through lessons 
learned, and with the aid of IEEE, NIST, W3C, and OITS have assisted with the 
development of the 18 methodologies. However, how to deploy the security solutions and 
in what circumstances is left to IS personnel to plan, design and implement. 
4.1 SQL Database Security 
As previously discussed, due to the risks of exposure through Web technologies 
there are issues to consider when planning SQL database security within the thin­client 
environment. Table 3 below depicts the planning questions and comments 
Table 3 ­ Database Security Considerations 
Question Response Comments 
Is this an existing SQL Y/N Name of database 
database? 
Is this a new SQL database? Y/N Name of database 
Use of a middleware Y/N Name of application 
application 
AES database encryption Y/N 
AES table record field Y/N Names of tables, and fields for encryption 
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encryption 
User Views Y/N Naming convention of user views 
Procedures Y/N Naming convention procedures 
Functions Y/N Naming convention of functions 
Triggers Y/N Naming convention of triggers 
Audit SQL logs Y/N Naming convention of logs and storage path 
Audit Tables Y/N Naming convention of tables, and the field 
names of data to record 
User rights to create tables Y/N User groups with rights 
User rights to share tables Y/N User groups with rights 
Session restriction Y/N User groups with restrictions 
Smart card access Y/N 
Key Fob access Y/N 
Certificate access Y/N 
4.1.1 – Planning Security for Thin­client Implementation with an Existing SQL Database 
Planning security for an existing SQL database involved many of the same 
processes that are involved with the creation of a new SQL database. An additional item 
of consideration is the ramifications of possibly having to alter the security features 
within the database. Other tasks and considerations are as follows: 
1.	 A review of each table, the data it contains and planning for the CRUD activities 
of the end users as in the billing table reflected in Table 1. 
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2.	 Data mapping user roles and groups as in Figure 9, to note what fields require 
data encryption (if any) and the screen views for users. 
3.	 Review of the data contained in the SQL database and making the decision to 
encrypt the entire database due to the sensitive nature of the database. 
4.	 Deciding if a middleware application would better secure the database and if so: 
a.	 Are the views and encryption going to be within the application or the 
database? 
i.	 If so, consideration on how to remove the current security features 
of views and encryption from the current database without 
affecting the users and the reliability of the database. 
ii.	 If not, consideration on how to interface the current security 
features with the application without affecting the users and the 
reliability of the database. 
b.	 Are the current triggers, functions and procedures naming conventions 
within the database consistent or do they required revisions? 
c.	 Would the interface to application require additional triggers, functions, 
and procedures to secure the database? 
5.	 Are there fields for data entry that can be restricted to drop down selections? 
6.	 Are there fields for data entry that can be restricted in length? 
7.	 Are there SQL audit logs, and if so, where are they stored? 
8.	 Are there the current audit tables within the SQL database sufficient? 
Although the SQL database is in production and functioning, the review will help 
to assure HIPAA and SOX compliance. While the database may have met the 
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requirements under fat­client technology, the exposure to the Web and using thin­client 
may require additional security features. As an example, currently some user 
permissions allow session table creation to obtain information for clinical trials. While 
the information the users obtain is not patient specific or may use a patient identification 
number with no name associated, the ability to create the table and access data tables 
directly using SQL commands presents a security issue within thin­client (Greenwald et 
al., 1999/2004). Possibly a new reporting feature, or a new view to extrapolate patient 
related, yet not patient specific information is created, using the users criteria, rather than 
allowing session table creation. The design would call procedures and functions by name 
rather than directly perform SQL commands, thus adding another layer of security. The 
premise is not to make the end­users job more difficult; it is to comply with SOX and 
HIPAA regulations to secure data. As long as the reporting or view offers the end user 
the information sought in the performance of job function then the feature meets both 
security and user’s needs . 
4.1.2 ­ Planning Security for Thin­client Implementation with a New SQL Database 
As a fellow student in my Database Concepts class, David Kizhner, so aptly 
stated during a discussion on data normalization “It is about the data, the whole data and 
nothing but the data, so help me Codd” (D. Kizhner, 2007). Security is all about the 
protection of data, SOX and HIPAA are all about the protection of individuals’ sensitive 
personal data. Considered to be an IS industry best practice is to include security features 
within each phase of design, development and implementation (McGovern et al., 2004). 
Knowing that the database implementation will be within thin­client technologies, makes 
planning for security more focused and does not change the questions asked as outline in 
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section 4.1.1 except in the form of how are these features are implemented, not are these 
features currently implemented. 
Knowing that the database will have a front­end application does beg the question 
as to whether the database will control the AES encryption, or if application will use AES 
encryption. The same applies to Views, Triggers Procedures and Functions. Again, there 
are no hard rules stating that one is a better practice over the other (Monroe, Kompanek, 
Melton, & Garland, 2003). Using one security feature within the database and another 
within the application does not mean that one or the other is a best practice. However, 
consistence in design is an IS industry best practice and is extremely important for future 
changes over the life cycle of the database and its middleware application (Powell & 
McCullough, 2007). The ramifications of incorporating one security feature within the 
database and another within the application are considerations. While in certain 
circumstances, it may be best to use AES encryption at the database level, or fields within 
the database, it may be best to design views and limit field character length at the 
application level. 
4.2 – Application Security Design 
As within the database design the question involving the application design 
revolve around the whether or not the application is an existing application with an 
additional feature added or if this is a new application design for the use of thin­client 
technologies. The processes of questions are slightly different due to the knowledge that 
this application will access the SQL database and work with the database to manipulate 
data. Thus, many of the database features are a consideration. 
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Table 4 ­ Application Security Considerations
 
Question Response Comments 
Is this an existing 
application? 
Y/N Name of application 
Is this a new application? Y/N Name of application 
Will the application use 
aliases to access the 
database table and fields 
Y/N Name of database 
Naming conventions of aliases 
Will the application use 
MVC to access the 
database? 
Y/N 
Is AES record field 
encryption done at the 
database level? 
Y/N Names of tables, and fields encrypted – user, 
roles and groups affected. 
AES record field encryption Y/N Names of tables, and fields for encryption – 
user roles and groups affected. 
Are database views used? Y/N Names of views and purpose of views – user, 
roles, and groups affected 
Are application views used? Y/N Naming convention of views – user, roles, and 
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groups affected. 
Are application procedures 
used? 
Y/N Naming convention of procedures and purpose 
of procedures 
Are database procedures 
used? 
Y/N Procedure names, and when to call the 
procedure 
Are functions used? Y/N Naming convention of functions and purpose 
of function 
Are database functions 
used? 
Y/N Functions names, and when to call the 
functions 
Triggers Y/N Naming convention of triggers and when to 
call the trigger 
Are the database triggers 
used? 
Y/N Trigger names, and when to call the triggers 
Field length restrictions Y/N Names of fields and restriction 
Field entry type restrictions Names of fields and type restriction 
Application logs Y/N Naming convention of logs and storage path 
User access by user, role 
and groups 
Y/N Naming conventions 
Session restriction Y/N User groups with restrictions 
Smart card access Y/N 
Key Fob access Y/N 
Certificate access Y/N 
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While stated in section 2.3.1 that hiding the database behind database handler 
routines, is old technology but allows the database design to change while preserving the 
original interface (Britton & Bye, 2004), it is important to note that this is considered one 
of the better security practices. Using the applications to call by name the database 
procedures and functions minimizes the risk of code disclosure (Swanson & Guttman, 
1996/2008). 
4.2.1 ­ Planning Security for Thin­client Implementation with a Middleware Application 
One of the medical industries problems with implementation of new technologies 
is the existence of many legacy IS systems (Bunker, 2008). When faced with adding new 
technologies, issues and problems occur due to forced restrictions or constraints because 
of the legacy systems limitations. Questions occur regarding programming consistency, 
such as; since one of the middleware application modules must use AES encryption due 
to the legacy systems constraints, do all application modules thereafter have to use AES 
encryption at the application level? There is no rule that states that developers must 
continue to use old technology within new projects due to the limitation of legacy 
systems (McGovern et al., 2004). The important fact is to be consistent with the 
programming practices within the same programming module. Thus, if using AES 
encryption at the database field level, then throughout the life cycle of the database and 
its middleware application module, all AES encryption takes place at the database. IS 
industry best practice is to note security features within the database and to build upon 
security within the application and not duplicate (McGovern et al., 2004). Using the 
questions in Table 4, if the answer to AES field encryption at the database level is yes, 
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then there is no reason to use AES encryption within the application. The same may or 
may not hold true for views. 
The views at the database level may be strictly for users directly accessing the 
database outside of the thin­client technology. The views constructed within the database 
may not meet the criteria for restricting views within the thin­client application. If the 
criteria for the thin­client environment specifically state that no user has access directly to 
the database, then the requirement calls for application designed views. Thus, it is 
probably to have views in both the database and within the application (Meier et al., 
2003). What is important is that the views meet the security requirements of the user, 
role, and groups. Another scenario is that an application view calls a database view that is 
read only, thus meeting the user’s needs to view certain data without directly 
manipulating the data within the database, and meeting the application security of using a 
named object call to the database which shields the original source from detection. 
The use of the database functions, procedures and triggers greatly reduces 
application programming time and the chance of misinterpretation of the database 
functionality (Powell & McCullough, 2007). While the application may have some 
procedures for database access and other application functionality, using the database 
functions, procedures and triggers to manipulate the data aids in maintain data integrity 
and security (Powell & McCullough, 2007). The concern is using the correct function or 
procedure within the development of the application. It is extremely important for 
database developers and the application developers to have constant communication 
regarding the design, development and implementation of thin­client technologies to 
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avoid duplication of effort, maintain consistency in design, and the reuse of code for 
expediency (McGovern et al., 2004). 
Dependent on technology in place there are times where a duplication of security 
features occur such as: 
1.	 Using key certificates to access the application and the database 
2.	 Using Key Fobs and Smart cards to access the application and the database 
3.	 User ID and Password verification to access the application and the database 
(Riedl, 2008) 
While this duplication may go unnoticed by the end­user, validation passes 
between the technology, the application and the database. The application and the 
database should each have a user access schema with user role and group permissions. 
The server and the application audit logs note user access times. 
The application audit logs should contain more than just the user’s access. The 
purpose of the audit logs is to trail every action that a user takes while working within the 
application. The audit logs can be an excellent troubleshooting tool for application errors 
however, more significantly, they serve as a record for any attempted security breach as 
well as a record of a security breach. By reviewing the audit logs and noting how security 
failed, developers can then correct the hole within the application security (Swanson & 
Guttman, 1996/2008). 
4.3 – Summary of Security Implementation 
Securing data within the thin­client environment is a combined effort of the 
database and application developers and the systems technology personnel (McGovern et 
al., 2004). While there may be overlapping security features such as user ID and 
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password for access at server, the application and the database there are security features 
that have no need for overlapping or require duplication. The most important part of 
security design is consistency of design, for doing so eliminates the possibilities of 
security holes, security misinterpretation, and user access conflicts (Christensen, 
Schneider, Thayer, & Winters, 2001/2003). Thus if encryption is used at the medical 
SQL database level or database table field level, then there is no need for encryption at 
the application level. 
While there may be reasons to have user, role, and group restrictive views within 
both the database and the application, proper design of database views allows the 
application developers to call the views by name and reduce the risk of code disclosure. 
This premise also holds true for database procedures, functions, and triggers (Meier et al., 
2003). On the other hand, application developer’s use of alias table name and table field 
insure that the code does not disclose any pertinent information on the database. This is 
important within the thin­client environment due to exposure through the Web interface 
and the ingenuity of those with malicious intent (Watson et al., 2005). Anyone gaining 
intimate knowledge through malicious activity of the application, the database or both 
presents an immediate concern for data security and integrity (Britton & Bye, 2004). 
Restricting users by limiting field character length, denying special characters, 
and forcing data selection for data field entry guard against SQL injection and malicious 
code entry and protect data integrity. While these restrictions are at both the database and 
application level it is beneficial to be consistent with designing techniques to eliminate 
confusion over the life cycle of the database and the application during future changes 
(McGovern et al., 2004). Restricting user access session times to work hours aides in 
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eliminating intrusions during off hours and through audit logs alert DBA’s, and IT 
personnel of an attempted breach using a users login ID and password (Watson et al., 
2005). 
The creation of SQL audit logs, SQL audit tables, and application audit logs are 
important security features and an IS industry and medical industry best practice. The 
audit logs and tables are a valuable source for noting security breaches and attempted 
security breaches and assist developers in shoring up both the database and application 
security against the malicious activity (Swanson & Guttman, 1996/2008). 
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Chapter 5 – Lessons Learned and Next Evolution of the Project 
The similarities in designing security for a medical SQL database and a 
middleware application became very apparent quickly within the researched 
documentation. The question then became, when would using one security design within 
the medical SQL database or middleware application be better within the overall design? 
My conclusion is that it more important to be consistent within the security design and 
have a documented security design. Thus, if using AES at the medical SQL database 
level would then require the use of AES with all medical SQL databases where data 
encryption is a requirement. The reasons that consistency is so important, is over the life 
cycle of the SQL database and its middleware application is that: 
1.	 Consistency in security design makes changes, updates and revision easier by 
knowing the security pattern and thus aides in maintaining security integrity. 
2.	 Consistency in design makes it easier for unit testing by following the security 
chain through the SQL database, its middleware application and server interface. 
3.	 Consistency in design makes it easier to troubleshoot, and to shore up a security 
design in the event of a breach. 
Communication 
Because the SOX and HIPAA regulations and the need to maintain data integrity 
and confidentiality forces the designers, developers and engineers to review every data 
process taking place within the IS, and to document and evaluate security operations on a 
regular basis. This also means that the DBA’s, designers, developers and system 
engineers have excellent and open communication among themselves. The security 
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design is too important not to have an understanding between all parties responsible for 
the security of confidential information. Without proper communication between security 
development teams, a change within the database, the application, or at the server level 
can break the security chain throughout the IS. 
System Documentation and Audit Logs 
Audit logs and audit tables are extremely important to the successful security 
design. In the event of a breach of security, following the audit logs and tables enables 
the designers, developers and engineers to focus directly on the area where security failed 
to meet the SOX and HIPAA requirements and the organizations security requirements. 
While not within the realm of this study, that use of external third party security 
programs and utilities are items for consideration, and evaluation for use. Often 
developers attempt to reinvent rather then to use a documented and useful solution is 
already in existence (Fowler, 2003). This is an area for further investigation and 
interpretation in security design. 
Testing and Evaluation 
As with database design and application design, an important aspect of security 
design is the on going evaluation and testing of the security features. Security design also 
has a life cycle that includes updates and revisions as needs change through database and 
application updates and revisions. While not a part of this study, it would be interesting to 
investigate testing methodologies. 
Summary 
The five lessons learned are the need for consistency of design, open 
communication with all responsible security personnel, excellent on­going 
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documentation through logs and audit tables, an understand the life cycle of the security 
design and the regular testing of security features. While there is cross over between 
database and application security design it is important for every organization to review 
what is currently in place, what is working well or what should be improved upon, and to 
determine what features are best utilized within the database opposed to use within the 
application. 
Within the thin­client environment, it is extremely important to know the table 
and field structure of the SQL medical database, how each piece of data relates to the 
SOX and HIPAA rules and regulations, and to the business rules of the organization for 
planning security. Knowing the database structure and the value of the data as it relates 
to regulatory compliancy, makes it easier to evaluate user roles and groups for the 
security design of database and application access, user views, database and application 
procedures, functions and triggers. Due to the exposure to the World Wide Web 
(WWW) and the probability of malicious activities, that the methodologies discussed 
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Appendix A 
Sarbanes­Oxley Act Section 302 
This section is of course listed under Title III of the act, and pertains to 'Corporate 
Responsibility for Financial Reports'. 
Summary of Section 302 
Periodic statutory financial reports are to include certifications that: 
• The signing officers have reviewed the report 
• The report does not contain any material untrue statements or material omission 
or be considered misleading 
• The financial statements and related information fairly present the financial 
condition and the results in all material respects 
• The signing officers are responsible for internal controls and have evaluated 
these internal controls within the previous ninety days and have reported on their 
findings 
• A list of all deficiencies in the internal controls and information on any fraud 
that involves employees who are involved with internal activities 
• Any significant changes in internal controls or related factors that could have a 
negative impact on the internal controls 
Organizations may not attempt to avoid these requirements by reincorporating their 
activities or transferring their activities outside of the United States 
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Appendix B 




Confidentiality of Health Information
 
Statement of the Right Consumers have the right to communicate with health care 
providers in confidence and to have the confidentiality of their individually 
identifiable health care information protected. Consumers also have the right to 
review and copy their own medical records and request amendments to their 
records. 
In order to ensure this right: 
•	 With very few exceptions, individually identifiable health care information can be 
used without written consent for health purposes only, including the provision of 
health care, payment for services, peer review, health promotion, disease 
management, and quality assurance. 
•	 In addition, disclosure of individually identifiable health care information without 
written consent should be permitted in very limited circumstances where there is a 
clear legal basis for doing so. Such reasons include: medical or health care 
research for which an institutional review board has determined anonymous 
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•	 To the maximum feasible extent in all situations, nonidentifiable health care 
information should be used unless the individual has consented to the disclosure 
of individually identifiable information. When disclosure is required, no greater 
amount of information should be disclosed than is necessary to achieve the 
specific purpose of the disclosure. 
Rationale 
The legal right to confidentiality of health care information and its essential role in the 
delivery of quality health care has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court, 
lower Federal and State courts, and Federal and State lawmakers. Similarly, a health care 
provider's obligation to protect the confidentiality of health information is universally 
recognized. The assurance that consumers' health information will remain confidential is 
"fundamental to effective diagnosis, treatment and healing" (Shalala, 1997). 
At the same time, the quality of the health care system also depends on the regular 
exchange of information between providers, employers, plans, public health authorities, 
researchers, and other users. The changing structure of the health care system and rapid 
advances in information technology and medical and health care research have increased 
the demand for and supply of health information among traditional users such as the 
treating physician, and new users, such as large networks of providers, information 
management companies, quality and utilization review committees, and independently 
contracted service providers. Concerns have been raised that, under the current system of 
information exchange, various entities can access individually identifiable information 
without sufficient security safeguards and consent requirements. 
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Other activities undertaken to improve quality and efficiency may present new risks to 
the confidentiality of health information. For example, quality oversight activities by 
plans, providers, accreditation bodies, and regulatory agencies require detailed 
information about the treatment and benefit status of individual consumers. The growing 
role of employers in workforce health issues has also contributed to the confidentiality 
debate. 
Congress has made repeated attempts to enact a comprehensive Federal confidentiality 
law but has, to date, been unsuccessful. The web of protections at the Federal and State 
level that has evolved in the absence of a comprehensive law leaves many aspects of 
health information unevenly protected. Specialized Federal protections already exist 
through statutes that address substance abuse, Medicaid beneficiaries, public health, 
research, government records, and those living with disabilities. 
Several States have enacted comprehensive laws and an effort is currently under way at 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners to draft a Protected Health 
Information Model Act for States. Other safeguards have evolved outside of the 
legislative arena. Accreditation bodies have incorporated requirements for confidentiality 
policies and patient consent (JCAHO 1996; NCQA 1997; URAC 1996) and continue to 
collaborate on security and confidentiality issues (JCAHO/NCQA Joint Session, 1997). 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) required the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to submit to the Congress detailed 
recommendations on: (1) the rights that an individual who is a subject of individually 
identifiable information should have; (2) the procedures that should be established for the 
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exercise of such rights; and (3) the uses and disclosures of such information that should 
be authorized or required (Public Law 104­191). On September 11, Health and Human 
Services Secretary Donna Shalala presented those proposals to the Congress (Shalala, 
1997). Under the terms of HIPAA, if Congress fails to enact Federal confidentiality 
legislation by August 1999, the Secretary of HHS is required to promulgate regulations 
setting confidentiality standards. 
The Secretary recommends a comprehensive Federal confidentiality law that would apply 
"floor preemption," meaning that the law would require that all States comply with a 
minimum set of confidentiality requirements but would not preempt stronger State laws. 
Section 262 of HIPAA also requires the Secretary of HHS to adopt standards by 
February 1998 for electronic transmission of financial and administrative health care 
transactions (including information about claims, eligibility, payment, and injury), unique 
health identifiers (for individuals, employers, plans, and providers), and security. 
The Commission believes that it is essential to establish a comprehensive confidentiality 
framework and encourages the Congress to move forward expeditiously. 
Implications of the Right 
• Health plans, health providers, employers, and other group purchasers 
should examine existing confidentiality protections to safeguard against improper 
use or release of individually identifiable information. The Commission does not 
intend to impede employers or providers from complying with duties established 
by law. Health providers, facilities, and plans should develop procedures to ensure 
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that when sensitive services (e.g., mental health, substance abuse, reproductive 
services, or treatment of sexually transmitted diseases) are involved, standard 
administrative techniques do not inadvertently disclose information to individuals 
other than the patient. This is not intended to create two standards of 
nondisclosure ­­ one for sensitive medical conditions and another for all others. It 
is merely a recognition that there may be high level concern about confidentiality 
with certain medical conditions by some patients. 
Law enforcement officers, researchers, and public health agencies should 
examine their existing policies to ensure that they access individually identifiable 
information only when absolutely necessary and provide proper safeguards to 
assure confidentiality. 
Consumers should become more aware of the content of their health records and 
pay particular attention to requests by providers, plans, employers, or others to 
gain access to those records. 
URAC National Network Accreditation Standards (April 1996). 
78
 




                     
 
 
                               
                           
                
           
           
                     
     
 
                       
                     
                             
                     
                         
           
 
 
                           
                         
                       
Melissa Winner­Leoni Thesis 2008
 
Annotated Bibliography 
A guide to the Sarbanes­Oxley act. (2002). Retrieved April 28, 2008, http:// 
www.soxlaw.com/index.htm 
This is the official Web site of SOX law that provides a guide to the 
Sarbanes­Oxley act of 2002, covering the general rules and regulations placed into law in 
2002. An additional link at this web site http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi­
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_ bills&docid=f:h3763enr.txt.pdf links to the 
complete Sarbanes­Oxley Act of 2002. 
Aaron, N. (2006). Oracle database security. Retrieved August 18, 2008, from 
Infosecwriters Web site: http://209.85.173.104/search?q=cache:B­
QWgf08WKIJ:www.infosecwriters.com/text_resources/pdf/ 
Oracle_NAaron.pdf+Database+View+Security&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=27&gl=us 
Aaron discusses the complexity of using user views, data encryption and various 
forms of security and how employees intentionally or unintentionally access information 
due to design and user access errors. While Aaron mentions poor database design he also 
reference DBA’s schema errors and placing false trust in employees. 
Andrews, C. (2001). SQL server 2000 security secrets. Retrieved July 11, 2008, from 




Chip Andrews discusses SQL Server 2000 and the use of certificates to validate 
users. Andrews writes about solving the integrated security dilemma and auditing logs. 
Andrews offers additional information on data encryption and the advantages of using 
79
 
          
 
 
                          
                       
 
                             
                 
 
                          
                         
                          
                           
     
 
                         
                 
 
                           
                           
            
 
                             
         
 
                           
                     
Melissa Winner­Leoni Thesis 2008
 
third­party encryption methods. Andrews also cites that there is a problem with SQL 
Server 2000, as encryption inside the database is not an option. 
Barak, B., Herzberg, A., Naor, D., & Shai, E. (2002). The proactive security toolkit and 
applications. Retrieved June 15, 2008, from ScientificCommons Web site: http:// 
de.scientificcommons.org/492942 
The authors discuss the measures to take a proactive approach to security. They 
advocate cryptography but also state that security relies heavily upon using the correct 
architecture and integrations. The authors are concerned with breaches in security due to 
connectivity with legacy systems making it more difficult to use today’s user ID and 
password standards. 
Basch, R. (2008). What is Kerberos. . (Original work published 1990) Retrieved August 
2, 2008, from Massachusetts Institute of Technology Web site: http:// 
web.mit.edu/Kerberos/#what_is 
Basch offers a brief history of Kerberos and the development of the protocol. The 
author’s intent of this document is a pre­in to accessing the protocol versions and 
documentation for installation and use. 
Britton, C., & Bye, P. (2004). IT architectures and middleware (C. Britton & P. Bye, 
Eds.). Boston: Pearson Education, Inc. 
In this book Britton and Bye, discuss Web services and .Net technology, covering 
middleware, principles of distribution, application integration design and the concepts of 
80
 
          
 
 
                            
                           
                        
 
 
                     
       
 
 
           
           
            
           
               
             
              
           
    
 
                       
                   
     
                     
                           
Melissa Winner­Leoni Thesis 2008
 
using a structured approach to system integration. In Chapter 6 Britton and Bye discuss 
the n­tier approach to application development and explain how each tier relates to each 
other. Britton and Bye present the various schools of thoughts regarding tier 
relationships. 
Bunker, G. (2007, September 10). Is your privacy protected? Hospital Management. 
Retrieved May 28, 2008, http://www.hospitalmanagement.net/features/ 
feature1311/
In this article, Bunker is concerned with medical information in electronic
healthcare records (EPR) system being secure and not susceptible to unwanted
audiences in a global setting. Bunker discusses the controversies of using
Information Technology (IT) to maintain patient records and the security challenges
of doing so. Many of the resources and information provided by Bunker come from
Naomi Fulop, professor of health and health policy at King’s College, London,
himself, Guy Bunker the senior director of technical strategy at Symantec and Paul
Cundy, spokesman for general practice computing at the British Medical Association
(BMA).
Christensen, M., Schneider, G., Thayer, R., & Winters, J. (2003). Software engineering 
(R. Thayer & M. Dorfman, Eds.). Danvers, MA: Wiley­Interscience. (Original 
work published 2001) 
The authors present many article on Software Engineering and the development 
process. This is an excellent resource for information supported by the IEEE. Articles 
81
 
          
 
 
                     
               
 
                       
               
 
                         
                      
                     
 
                     
                 
 
                        
                                
                             
 
                     
     
                          
                         
                   
 
Melissa Winner­Leoni Thesis 2008
 
reference current software design in relationship with legacy systems, difficulties with 
software maintenance, and issues with cross platform security. 
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the original ground breaking documentation on relational databases. Codd discusses 
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ed.) (D. Russell, Ed.). Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly Media, Inc. (Original 
work published 1999) 
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system by injecting malformed SQL queries into a data field, and he offers sample 
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McGovern, J., Ambler, S., Stevens, M., Linn, J., Sharan, V., & Jo, Elias. (2004). A 
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(2003). Web server security. Retrieved August 2, 2008, from Microsoft Web site: 
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This is an instructional documentation from Microsoft on securing a Web server. 
The authors cover known vulnerabilities and Microsoft’s solutions to data protection. 
While geared directly towards Microsoft’s own products, its overview on vulnerabilities 
relate to any Web server and connection to the Internet. 
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Retrieved August 27, 2008, from Microsoft Web site: http://msdn.microsoft.com/ 
en­us/library/ms994921.aspx 
The authors of this article cover some very common sense type of security 
measure for shoring up information presented on a Web server with thin client access. 
The authors also explain vulnerabilities, and countermeasures with a means of improving 
the user experience without jeopardizing security. 
Monroe, R., Kompanek, A., Melton, R., & Garland, D. (2003). Architectural styles, 
design patterns, and objects. software engineering, 1, 241. 
The authors discuss software architectural styles, design patters, and objects 
however, they do not advocate one approach over another. This is an excellent resource 
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Padilla, R. (2005). Don't gamble with HIPAA security compliance. Retrieved August 2, 
2008, from Techrepublic Web site: http://articles.techrepublic.com.com/5100­
10878_11­5760663.htmlpart=rss&tag=feed&subj=tr 
Padilla discusses the problems with meeting HIPAA regulations and electronic 
employee connectivity and activity. Padilla explains the chances some institutions are 
taking by not being fully HIPAA compliant. 
Powell, G., & McCullough, C. (2007). Oricle 10g database administrator 
implementation & administration. Boston: Thomson Course Technology. 
(Original work published 2007) 
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Powell and McCullough explain Oracle 10g database administration from the 
implementation of a database through its life cycle. An excellent source for 
administration of an Oracle database, the users, data security, troubleshooting and Oracle 
features. 
Praities, N., & Anekwe, L. (2008, February 6). BMA brands mental health law 'unethical. 
Pulsenews, p. 10. 
The author’s are reporting on the British Medial Association (BMA) decision to 
have all mental health patients information placed into a national database. The author’s 
note that one of the main reasons by physicians to resist a national database is the concern 
that information within database not being adequately secured. The author’s state 
statistics that 9 out of 10 doctors believe that patient’s records will be at risk if placed 
into a national depository. 
Riedl, B. (2008). Pseudonymization for improving the privacy in e­Health applications. 
In B. Riedl, V. Grascher, S. Fenz., & T. Neubauer (Eds.), Proceedings of the 41st 
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences ­ 2008 (pp. 1­10). Vienna: 
IEEE. 
The author’s describe Pseudonymization; a technique where identification data is 
transformed, and replaced by a specifier that cannot be associated with the identification 
data without knowing a certain secret. The author’s describe the good points of 
Pseudonymization and the bad points by explaining the consequences. However, the 
author’s find Pseudonymization to be a more secure and expedient means to secure data 
rather than data encryption which when applied to healthcare graphics such as 
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mammograms can be inefficient and time­consuming. The author’s also describe in 
detail the formulas and definition of system attributes for Pseudonymization. 
Sausner, R. (2008). Keeping your DBA honest. Banking Technology News, Unknown, 1. 
While this article relates to the banking industry, Sausner references the medical 
industry and the ability of DBA’s to cover their tracks while snooping on celebrities 
medical files. This is an excellent article where Sausner discusses the use of audit logs 
and tracking user access in conjunction with electronic signature software that notes 
breaks in audit logs. 
Schach, S. (2007). Object­oriented & classical software engineering (7th ed.). New 
York: McGraw­Hill. 
In this book, Schachs discusses the best practices within the software 
development life cycle. Schach goes into detail on the Agile Methodology of software 
engineering through the software process, working in teams, testing and cohesion. Often 
he reflects on the classical software engineering process compared to OOP software 
engineering, and contrasting the differences. 
Shepherd, M., Zitner, D., & Watters, C. (2000). Medical portals: web­based access to 
medical information. In M. Shepherd, D. Zitner, & C. Watters (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the 33rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences ­
2000 (pp. 1­10). Halifax, Canada: IEEE. 
The author’s investigate the 3­Tier based Portal for Web­based access to medical 
information. The author’s model the process and show the complexity of security 
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required within the architecture. The author’s define the pull, push and update process of 
sending and receiving data. The author’s also describe the needs for data from the 
physician’s role and the CEO’s role. The references are excellent and a good choice for 
secondary research such as: Computer­based Patient Record Institute, Health Level 7 and 
the National Library of Medicine. 
Singhal, A. (2007). Guide to secure web services. In Computer security subcategory, web 
services (NIST Special Publication 800­95). Gaithersburg, MD: U.S. Department 
of Commerce. Retrieved June 1, 2008, from U.S. Department of Commerce, 
National Institute of Standards and Technology Web site: 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800­95/SP800­95.pdf 
Singhal describes and covers NIST guidelines for securing Web services. Section 
5 is concerned with legacy software’s, databases, and their security. Section 5 also covers 
HIPAA policy as set forth in 800­66­Rev1/Draft_SP800­66­Rev1.pdf references 
Smid, M. (2001). Announcing the advanced encryption standard. Springfield, VA: 
National Institute of Systems Technology. (NTIS No. PB­197) Retrieved August 
21, 2008, from National Institute of Systems Technology Web site: http:// 
csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips­197.pdf 
Smid covers the use of AES as the new standard in encryption offering 
information on the history and evolution of encryption. Smid explains how AES became 
the standard and depicts how the functionality algorithm works. 
Swanson, M., & Guttman, B. (2008). Generally accepted principles and practices for 
securing information technology systems. . (Original work published 1996) 
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Retrieved August 2, 2008, from National Institute of Standards and Technology 
Web site: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800­14/800­14.pdfWatson, K., 
The authors wrote this document as a standard supported by the NIST covering 
security of information and technology systems. Audit logs are covered in Chapter 3 
beginning on page 50 offering a wealth of information on what audit logs should contain, 
how they are to be constructed and the advantage of not just creating and having them, 
but regular review of the information they contain. 
The advisory commission on consumer protection, & quality in the health care industry. 
(1999). Chapter 6: Confidentiality of Health Information. In consumer bill of 
rights and responsibilities (pp. 16­18).. Retrieved July 19, 2008, from opm.gov 
Web site: http://www.opm.gov/insure/health/cbrr.htm#chpt6 
This is the official government Web site on HIPAA rules and regulations. 
Chapter 6 is on the laws that govern health care information. The requirements and the 
exceptions are discussed in detail. 
Watson, K., Nagel, C., Pedersen, H., Reid, J., Skinner, M., & White, E. (2005). 
Beginning visual C# 2005 (K. Mohr, T. Dinse, T. Meister, A. Smith, M. 
Wakefield, R. Swadley, et al, Ed.). Indianapolis, IN: Wiley Publishing, Inc. 
The authors of this book instruct in writing Visual C# script within the .Net 
framework and more specifically Visual Studio 2005. Chapter 18 covers basic Web 
programming while chapter 23 explains XML use within a published application. The 
authors warn against using XML for any object that needs security. The authors cover in 
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detail deploying Web application in chapter 21 and discuss data access is detail within 
chapter 22. 
Woody, B. (2007). SQL server security (Version 1) [Computer software and manual]. 
Retrieved from http://www.informit.com/guides/ 
content.aspx?g=sqlserver&seqNum=245> 
Woody discusses and depicts SQL for Encrypting sensitive data and offering 
information on algorithms for asymmetric certification and keys. Woody also offers the
 
warnings of how locking yourself out of your own data becomes easy, thus encryptions
 
should not be entered into without planning.
 
W3C. (2008). http://www.w3.org/Security/ (W3C security home). Cambridge, MA:
 
Author. 
This is the official web site of the W3C accepted best security practices. Also 
presented is additional information regarding what the W3C is meeting and working on 
security standards but have not yet incorporated into the W3C standards. 
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AES Advance Encryption Standard 
Banner Grabbing Connecting to remote applications and observing the output. 
Blended Threat A blended threat is a sophisticated attack that bundles some of the 
worst aspects of viruses, worms, Trojan horses and malicious code 
into one threat. 
BMA British Medical Association 
Buffer Overflows Occurs when a program or process tries to store more data in 
temporary data storage then it was intended to hold. 
CRUD Create, Read, Update, Delete 
DES Data Encryption Standard 
Fob or Key Fob A hardware device that randomly generates an access code that 
changes every 30 to 60 seconds. Combines with a PIN number the 
fob generated code gives access to another computer. 
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
HTML HyperText Markup Language 
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol – a communications protocol for the 
transfer of information on the Internet. 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
Kerberos Kerberos is a protocol designed to enable two parties to exchange 
private information across an open network. 
IS Information Systems 
IT Information Technology 
NetBios 
Enumeration 
To gain information about the resources available on a host or 
network. 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
OITS Orissa Information Technology Society 
OOP Object Oriented Programming 
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PL/SQL Program Language/Structured Query Language 
MVC Model View Controller 
PAC Picture Archive and Communication Systems 
PIN Personal Identification Number 
Ping Sweeps Network scanning technique used to determine which of a range of 
IP addresses map to live computers. 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure 
Port Scans A series of messages sent by someone attempting to break into a 
computer to learn which computer network services, each 
associated with a well­known port number, the computer provides. 
SOX Sarbanes­Oxley 
SQL Structured Query Language 
SQL Injection SQL Injections is a technique that exploits a security vulnerability 
occurring in the database layer of an application by inserting a 
query into a data field. 
SSL Secure Socket Layer 
SYN Flood An attack that sends TCP connections request faster than a 
machine can process them causing the port to remain open and 
blocks authorized user(s) access. 
T­SQL Transact Structured Query Language 
XML Extensible Markup Language 
W3C World Wide Web Consortium 
WWW World Wide Web 
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